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Abstract
Many recent writers in the philosophy of mathematics have put great weight on the
relative categoricity of the traditional axiomatizations of our foundational theories of
arithmetic and set theory ([Par90], [Par08] §49, [McG97], [Lav99], [VW14]). Another
great enterprise in contemporary philosophy of mathematics has been Wright’s and
Hale’s project of founding mathematics on abstraction principles ([HW01], [Coo07]).
In [Wal12], it was noted that one traditional abstraction principle, namely Hume’s Prin-
ciple, had a certain relative categoricity property, which here we term natural relative
categoricity. In this paper, we show that most other abstraction principles are not nat-
urally relatively categorical, so that there is in fact a large amount of incompatibility
between these two recent trends in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. To better
understand the precise demands of relative categoricity in the context of abstraction
principles, we compare and contrast these constraints to (i) stability-like acceptability
criteria on abstraction principles (cf. [Coo12]), (ii) the Tarski-Sher logicality require-
ments on abstraction principles studied by Antonelli [Ant10b] and Fine [Fin02], and
(iii) supervaluational ideas coming out of Hodes’ work [Hod84, Hod90, Hod91].
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2
1 Introduction
Our topic in this paper is the compatibility of abstraction principles and relative categoricity.
The most famous example of an abstraction principle is Hume’s Principle, which asserts that
the number of X’s is the same as the number of Y ’s if and only if X and Y are equinumerous,
where this just means that there is a bijection between the X’s and Y ’s. In this, the
“number of” operator is understood to be a type-lowering operator which takes second-order
entities and returns first-order entities. Much of the interest in Hume’s Principle stems
from the fact that it, in conjunction with certain axioms for second-order logic, recovers the
now standard Peano axiomatization for arithmetic ([Wri83] Chapter 4, cf. [Wal12] §2.2 pp.
1688 ff). Wright vivified this in [Wri98] by asking us to consider the perspective of “Hero,”
who using Hume’s Principle recovers all the laws of pure and applied arithmetic using Frege’s
definitions for zero, successor, and natural number.
The motivation for relative categoricity is likewise often conveyed by considering the
perspective of agents. Parsons in his seminal essay [Par90] and later book [Par08, §49] asks
us to consider interlocutors h and c, each having access to her own structure satisfying the
axioms for arithmetic, but whose access to the other’s number structure comes primarily from
the other’s literal utterances. Initially it might appear that the incompleteness of arithmetic
could allow for intractable disagreement: perhaps the which structure agent h has in mind
witnesses the arithmetized version of the consistency of some theory, while the structure
agent c has in mind does not. However, Parsons notes that this can’t happen so long as
each interlocutor can in addition perform mathematical induction on concepts defined in
terms of the other’s natural number structure. If this is granted, then the map Γ defined
by Γ(0h) = 0c and Γ(sh(n)) = sc(Γ(n)) is an isomorphism, wherein 0i and si denote the zero
and successor of agent i’s number structure. Since isomorphisms preserve truth-values, the
two agents will agree on all sentences of the pure arithmetical vocabulary in which zero and
successor are taken as primitive.
So it’s natural to ask whether there is similar agreement when it comes to abstraction
principles. To expand upon Wright’s example, we might envision Hero as well as an interlocu-
tor Claudio, and ask whether their agreement upon Hume’s Principle leads to an agreement
on other numerical truths. Frege famously noted in the Grundlagen one potential source of
disagreement: Hero and Claudio might disagree about whether everything is a number, or
whether this-or-that object is a number ([Fre84], [Fre80] §56, §66). But it’s still natural to
ask what happens when we restrict attention to each agent’s pure numbers, that is, to the
range of each’s “number of” operator. One important species of agreement has been stressed
in the recent literature under the heading of the principle ‘Nq’. In terms of our scenario,
Hero and Claudio would both think that the number of Y ’s is equal to n, as defined in terms
of their respective “number of” operators, if and only if ∃=n x Y x, wherein this is the exact
numerical quantifier defined in the usual first-order way (cf. [Hal87] pp. 223-224, [Wri99]
p. 18, [HW01] p. 322, [Coo07] p. 32, [Wal14b] p. 92).
It turns out that this agreement extends to the truth-values of all pure numerical state-
ments, where again we understand by “pure” the restriction to the range of each “number of”
operator. For, our interlocutors, just like Parsons’, have a natural way of translating be-
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tween their individual pure number discourse. Designating Hero’s “number of” with “#h”
and Claudio’s with “#c,” we see that whenever Claudio utters a statement about his pure
numbers, we may replace each instance of #c by #h and obtain a truth about Hero’s pure
numbers. This is due to the fact that the map Γ(#h(X)) = #c(X) is an isomorphism be-
tween Hero’s and Claudio’s “pure number” structures, so that we can again appeal to the
fact that isomorphisms preserve the relevant truth-values. So not only will Hero and Clau-
dio agree about all the truths of number theory, they will agree also, for instance, that the
number of evens is the same as the number of natural numbers.
This result about Hume’s Principle was proven in the earlier paper [Wal12] (Proposition
14 p. 1687). However, this earlier work left open the question of whether this phenomena
persists when one considers other abstraction principles. For, Wright and Hale [HW01] have
emphasized that Hume’s Principle is just one abstraction principle amongst many. Other
principles can be obtained by replacing the equinumerosity relation with another equivalence
relation on second-order entities and by introducing a new type-lowering operator for each
such equivalence relation. So an abstraction principle is a principle of the following form:
(1.1) A[E] : ∀ X, Y (∂(X) = ∂(Y )↔ E(X, Y ))
In this, the quantifiers range over second-order entities and the operator ∂ takes second-order
entities and returns first-order entities. Moreover, the type-lowering operator ∂ is understood
to depend on the equivalence relation E. The case of the two agents is thus well-formalized
by the following principle:
(1.2) A2[E] : ∀ X, Y [(∂1(X) = ∂1(Y )↔ E(X, Y )) ∧ (∂2(X) = ∂2(Y )↔ E(X, Y ))]
Let’s call the objects in the range of the ∂i-operator the abstracts of interlocutor i, and let’s
denote this by rng(∂i). Then we say that the abstraction principle A[E] is naturally relatively
categorical if it can be proved from this principle A2[E] (and the axioms governing the second-
order logic) that the map Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(X) is an isomorphism between the abstracts of
the two interlocutors. For a more formal statement of natural relative categoricity, see
Definition 3.3, which we provide after carefully setting up the particulars of the background
second-order logic.
The present paper answers the question of what abstraction principles are naturally
relatively categorical by presenting various equivalent characterizations in terms of sameness
of cardinality and invariance under injections. These characterizations then allow us to
ascertain easily whether a given abstraction principle is naturally relatively categorical (see
§5 for examples). Let us build up to the statement of these equivalent characterizations
by introducing some key definitions we deploy in this paper. First, let us say that the
abstraction principle A[E] is cardinality coarsening on abstracts if the following is provable
from the abstraction principle and the associated principles of the second-order logic:
(1.3) ∀ X, Y ((Y ≈ X & X ⊆ rng(∂))→ E(X, Y ))]
In this, Y ≈ X is an abbreviation for the notion of equinumerosity operative in Hume’s
Principle, while rng(∂) is the collection of objects in the range of the type-lowering operator ∂;
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as above, we sometimes refer to these as the abstracts. Note that in (1.3), the concept Y is
not required to be subconcept of rng(∂). Further, let us say that the abstraction principle
A[E] is injection invariant on abstracts if the following is provable from the abstraction
principle and the associated principles of the ambient second-order logic:
(1.4) ∀ injection ι :V→V ∀ X ⊆ rng(∂) E(X, ι(X))
wherein V = {x : x = x} is an abbreviation for the concept of all objects and ι(X) means
{ι(x) : x ∈ X}. With this terminology in place, our primary characterization of natural
relative categoricity can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1.1. The following are equivalent:
1. The abstraction principle A[E] is naturally relatively categorical.
2. The abstraction principle A[E] is injection invariant on abstracts.
3. The abstraction principle A[E] is cardinality coarsening on abstracts.
This theorem is proven in §4. Prior to establishing this theorem, in §2 we define the partic-
ulars of the second-order logic which we’re employing– in short, we’re assuming full impred-
icative comprehension and strong forms of the axiom of choice. Then in §3 we present the
official definition of natural relative categoricity in Definition 3.3.
As mentioned above, Frege observed that abstraction principles like Hume’s Principle
don’t determine whether or not everything is an abstract. The idea behind the natural
relative categoricity of Hume’s Principle is that this is the only kind of statement– express-
ible in the language of Hume’s Principle– whose truth-value is left undetermined by Hume’s
Principle. So in natural relative categoricity we restrict attention down to the abstracts. A
complementary idea is to restrict attention to the case where the abstraction operator is as-
sumed to be a surjective map from concepts to objects. To this end, let us call an abstraction
principle A[E] surjectively relatively categorical if it can be proved (in the background logic)
from A2[E], and the claim that ∂1 and ∂2 are surjective, that the map Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(X) is an
isomorphism between the abstracts of the two interlocutors. In analogy with our first main
Theorem 1.1, our second main theorem establishes the following equivalent characterization
of surjective relatively categorical abstraction principles:
Theorem 1.2. The following are equivalent:
1. The abstraction principle A[E] is surjectively relatively categorical.
2. The abstraction principle A[E] is permutation invariant, under the assumption that
the abstraction operator is surjective.
3. The abstraction principle A[E] is bicardinality coarsening, under the assumption
that the abstraction operator is surjective.
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In analogy to injection invariance on abstracts (1.4), we say that A[E] is permutation invari-
ant if
(1.5) ∀ bijection pi :V→V ∀ X E(X, pi(X))
Further, in analogue to cardinality coarsening on abstracts (1.3), we say that A[E] is bicar-
dinality coarsening if
(1.6) ∀ X, Y (Y ≈ X & V \X ≈ V \Y )→ E(X, Y )
In this, V \X denotes the concept of all objects which are not in X. It’s worth emphasizing
that in the statement of Theorem 1.2, the last two conditions occur under the hypothesis
that the abstraction operator ∂ is surjective: for every object b there is a concept F such that
∂(F ) = b. Hence there is no restriction to abstracts in the formulations of permutation in-
variance (1.5) and bicardinality coarsening (1.6). As with our earlier theorem, Theorem 1.2 is
proven in §4; the formal definition of surjective relative categoricity is given in Definition 3.6,
subsequent to our treatment of the background second-order logic in the next section.
The aim of our Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 is to answer the question of what abstrac-
tion principles are relatively categorical in the specified senses, and in the coarsest of terms
these theorems indicate that such abstraction principles look a lot like Hume’s Principle,
so that relative categoricity amongst abstraction principles is the exception rather than the
rule. This obviously doesn’t directly imply that there’s a problem with appeals to either
abstraction principles or relative categoricity considerations. But it indicates that a choice
must be made: the advocate of relative categoricity arguments will find her preferred route
to determinacy of truth value blocked in the case of most abstraction principles, and the
advocate of abstraction principles might be pressed to find some other means by which to
secure determinacy of truth value. That said, it’s obviously non-trivial to spell out precisely
what philosophical concern or question is intended to be assuaged by securing determinacy
of truth-value (cf. [BW15]), and there are similarly problems with making out the case that
abstraction principles can secure knowledge of our foundational theories of arithmetic and
set theory (cf. [Wal14b]). This is not the place to adjudicate these larger philosophical
issues. Rather, the aim of this paper is limited to showing that the tools which one segment
of the philosophy of mathematics community have been using are largely incompatible with
the tools employed by another part of the community. And this despite the fact that both
relative categoricity and abstraction principles can be seen as latter-day descendants of the
idea that the subject-matter of mathematics is given by implicit definitions of its funda-
mental concepts (cf. [HW00], [Sha05] p. 13, pp. 168-169, [Sha91] p. 190, [Sha00] pp. 132
ff).
The present paper is organized as follows. In §2 we set out the particulars of the back-
ground second-order logic which we’re employing. Then in §3 we make a preliminary study
of the map Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(X), which we there call the natural bijection. In the subsequent
section §4 we prove Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2, as well as note some related results on
the underlying equivalence relations. In §5, we use these theorems to determine quickly
whether some well-known abstraction principles are relatively categorical in the senses we
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have adumbrated. In §§6-9 we contrast the nature of the requirement of relative categoric-
ity to other constraints on abstraction principles related to invariance and determinacy of
truth-value studied by authors such as Cook, Antonelli, Fine, and Hodes. In particular, in §6
we indicate where relatively categorical abstraction principles fit into the stability hierarchy
that has arisen in response to the Bad Company problem. In §7, we distinguish our notion
of permutation invariance (1.5) from notions studied by Antonelli and Fine and related to
the Tarski-Sher thesis on logicality. Finally, in §8 we note that the determinacy of truth
value ideas coming out of our notions of relative categoricity might be orthogonal to the
determinacy ideas coming out of Hodes’ supervaluationism (cf. Question 8.5).
2 Background Second-Order Logic
We work in a background second-order signature which contains a sort for objects as well
as a sort for n-ary relations for each n ≥ 1. Objects are written with lower-case roman
letters a, b, c, d, x, y, z, . . .. The unary relations are called concepts and written with upper-
case roman letters A,B,C,X, Y, Z, while n-ary relations for n > 1 are written with upper-
case roman letters R, S. The predication relation is written Xa or a ∈ X for objects a and
concepts X; and it is typically written R(a1, . . . , an) for n-ary relations. For the sake of
definiteness, let us then stipulate:
Definition 2.1. The background second-order signature L0 is the many-sorted signature
which consists merely of (i) sorts for objects and n-ary relations for each n ≥ 1, and (ii) for
each n ≥ 1, the (n+1)-ary predication relations R(x1, . . . , xn) wherein R is an n-ary relation
and x1, . . . , xn are objects.
The models of L0 thus have the following form:
(2.1) M = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . .)
whereinM is a non-empty set and S1[M ] ⊆ P (Mn), and wherein the predication relations are
interpreted with the membership relation from the ambient set-theoretic metatheory. Often
in what follows we will be discussing isomorphisms of L0-structures and related expansions.
In this connection, it’s useful to explicitly note that L0 itself does not contain any constant or
function symbols and does not contain any relation symbols besides the predication relation
symbols.
Suppose that L is an expansion of L0. An L-structure M whose L0-reduct is written
as in (2.1) is called standard if Sn[M ] = P (Mn); we do not assume here that all structures
are standard. The full comprehension schema for concepts in L is the collection of all the
following axioms:
(2.2) ∃ X ∀ x (Xx↔ Φ(x))
wherein Φ(x) is an L-formula and X does not appear free in Φ(x), but where Φ(x) may con-
tain other free variables which are reserved for parameters. There are similar comprehension
schemas for the n-ary relations.
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In this paper, it is assumed that all theories contain the full comprehension schema in
their signature for n-ary relations for all n ≥ 1. Our primary motivation for working with the
full comprehension schema in this paper is that it is presupposed by the statement of natural
relative categoricity, as we will make clear in the formal presentation of this notion below.
The comprehension schema allows us to use usual boolean connectivesA∩B,A∪B,A\B,A ⊆
B with their usual meanings on both concepts and n-ary relations for n > 1. Likewise, we
use A×B to denote the binary concept consisting of pairs (a, b) where a is from A and b is
from B. Sometimes in what follows we use the disjoint union notation A = B unionsqC, which of
course just means that A = B ∪ C and B ∩ C = ∅. In this paper, ∅ and V are reserved for
the concept of no objects and the concept of all objects, respectively:
(2.3) ∅ = {x : x 6= x}, V = {x : x = x}
In what follows, we often employ various abbreviations for formulas in second-order
logic. In particular, we use bracket notation {x : Φ(x)} as short-hand for the unique con-
cept X determined by Φ(x) from the comprehension axiom in equation (2.2), and likewise
we write {(x1, . . . , xn) : Φ(x1, . . . , xn)} in the case of n-ary relations. Functions are identi-
fied with their graphs, so that G : A → B is an abbreviation for the claim that the binary
relation G is such that for all a from A there is unique b from B with G(a, b). Likewise we
have the following abbreviations for cardinality-related notions:
(2.4) X ≈ Y or |X| = |Y | is an abbreviation for there being a bijection F : X → Y .
(2.5) |X| ≤ |Y | is an abbreviation for there being an injection F : X → Y .
(2.6) |X| < ω is an abbreviation for the claim thatX is Dedekind-finite, i.e. any injection F :
X → X is also a surjection; and we abbreviate |X| ≥ ω for its negation.
Another abbreviation which we shall employ repeatedly in what follows pertains to images
of concepts under maps on objects. Suppose that f : X → Y is a map and suppose X0 ⊆ X.
Then we define the image of X0 under f as f(X0) = {f(x) : x ∈ X0}, which is a concept by
full comprehension when f ∈ S2[M ]. Typically we apply this in the case where f : V → V ,
so that f(X) is defined for any concept X.
The other definitions that we need in order to state our results are two forms of the
axiom of choice. The first form is designated as AC, and it is the following schema:
(2.7) [∀ x ∃ R′ ϕ(R′, x)]→ ∃ R [∀ x ϕ(R[x], x)]
wherein R[x] = {y : Rxy}, which exists by full comprehension. Intuitively this says that if
for every n-tuple of objects x there is an m-ary concept R′ witnessing the condition ϕ(R′, x),
then there is an (n+m)-ary concept R such that for all n-tuples x the m-ary concept R[x]
is a witness. More intuitively still, this version of the axiom of choice says that if for each
object there is a concept satisfying a certain condition, then there is a uniform way to select
these concepts. This version of the axiom of choice was used frequently in the earlier papers
([Wal12] Definition 5 p. 1683, [Wal14a]) since in the setting of limited comprehension it is a
natural component of a sufficient condition for the so-called ∆11-comprehension schema.
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The other form of the axiom of choice that we employ is a form of global choice. Suppose
that T is a theory in one of our signatures. Then we let T+GC be the expansion of T by a
new binary relation symbol < on objects in the signature, with axioms saying that < is a
linear order of the first-order objects, and we additionally have a schema in the expanded
signature saying that any instantiated formula ϕ(x) in the expanded signature, perhaps
containing parameters, that holds of some first-order object x will hold of a <-least element:
(2.8) [∃ x ϕ(x)]→ [∃ x ϕ(x) & ∀ y < x ¬ϕ(y)]
Since all our theories T contain full comprehension (2.2), we have that the graph of < forms
a binary concept in T+GC. Of course the postulated binary relation < does not necessarily
have anything to do with the the usual “less than” relation on the natural numbers. This form
of global choice was also defined and employed in the paper [Wal14a] where it was likewise
designated as GC. So in contrast to equation (2.1), models of our global choice principle GC
have the form:
(2.9) M = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <)
where < is a linear order on M such that any non-empty M-definable subset has a least
element.
It’s worth stressing that L0 does not include the global well-order (cf. Definition 2.1).
For, the equivalence relations that we will consider will all be L0-formulas, and in §7, we will
note that this implies that the equivalence relations are logical in the sense of Tarski-Sher,
and this would be not be true if they included the global well-order. However, as far as theo-
ries and structures go, in what follows, it is assumed that all theories and structures contain
AC and GC. This of course may be taken to hold for standard structures by recourse to the
axiom of choice in the metatheory. Since we are additionally assuming full comprehension,
our models in effect look and act a lot like standard models. However, the advantage of work-
ing with arbitrary models of these axioms– instead of restricting ourselves to the standard
models– is that we have the the benefits of the completeness theorem (cf. [End01] Chapter 4,
[Man96] Chapter VII.2). So even though we are working model-theoretically, everything can
in principle be turned into a concrete deduction by recourse to this theorem. Because the
semantics for second-order logic are a contentious affair (cf. [Lin11] for overview), and be-
cause relative categoricity arguments have been traditionally motivated by concerns with
the standard semantics for second-order logic ([Par08] p. 270, [McG97] pp. 45-47, [Lav99]
p. 5), it is useful to adopt a framework in which our results do not depend on the choice of
semantics for second-order logic.
Our use of AC (2.7) is rather limited in this paper: we appeal to it to establish the
implication recorded in Figure 1 in §4 which allows us to go from conditions on an equivalence
relation to conditions on the associated abstraction principle; and we appeal to it a final time
to treat notions of finiteness in our discussion of the examples in §5. As for global choice
GC (2.8), the reason why we assume it in this paper is that it permits us to transfer the usual
properties of cardinal arithmetic to our deductive setting. In particular, in what follows we
make use of the following three properties:
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(2.10) Cardinal Comparability : ∀ X, Y (|X| ≤ |Y | ∨ |Y | ≤ |X|)
(2.11) Infinite Sums are Maxs : ∀ X |X| ≥ ω → [∀ Y, Z (X = Y unionsqZ → |X| = max{|Y | , |Z|})]
(2.12) Infinite Products are Maxs : ∀ Y, Z (|Y | ≥ ω ∨ |Z| ≥ ω)→ |Y × Z| = max{|Y | , |Z|}
Of course, by Cardinality Comparability (2.10), the maximum expressions make good sense.
For instance, the clause |X| = max{|Y | , |Z|} is just an abbreviation for the following con-
junction of conditionals, and Cardinality Comparability (2.10) implies that one of the two
antecedents is satisfied:
(2.13) (|Y | ≥ |Z| → |X| = |Y |) ∧ (|Z| ≥ |Y | → |X| = |Z|)
Note that Cardinality Comparatibility (2.10) follows from global choice GC: for, the global
well-order restricted to any two concepts yields two well-orders, and we can then use the
traditional proof that well-orders are either order-isomorphic or one is isomorphic to an initial
segment of the other (cf. [HJ99] p. 105, [Kun80] p. 15); and this result trivially implies that
each is comparable to the other in terms of cardinality as well. Similarly, we can transfer
the usual proof of Infinite Sums are Maxs and Infinite Products are Maxs (2.11)-(2.12) as
expressed in the language of set theory to our framework for second-order logic, since this
proof proceeds by transfinite induction, which we can emulate with our global well-order (cf.
[HJ99] pp. 134 ff, [Kun80] p. 29, [Kun11] p. 73).
Another use of the global well-order (V,<) that we employ is in giving an equivalent
characterization of Dedekind-finiteness (2.6). First, let’s introduce the following notation
for the initial segments: Ia = {b : b < a} and Ia = {b : b ≤ a}. Further, since (V,<) is a
non-empty well-order, it has a least element, which we designate as zero or 0. There’s also
a natural partial successor function s defined as follows:
(2.14) s(a) = min
<
(V \ Ia) = min
<
{b : b > a}
This function s might be partial because there might be a greatest element in well-order
(V,<). Finally, let’s say that a limit point in (V,<) is a point a > 0 such that b < a
implies s(b) < a. As in the theory of ordinals, the well-order (V,<) splits into zero, successors,
and limits. Finally, let’s say that a is finite if a is strictly below the all the limit points, and
let’s say that X is finite if X is bijective with Ia or Ia for some finite a. Then one can show
using induction that:
Proposition 2.2. (i) X is finite if and only if |X| < ω. (ii) If there is a least limit, and the
least limit point is designated as ω, then X is infinite iff there is an injection ι : Iω → X,
which happens iff |X| ≥ ω.
Hence, |X| ≥ ω (as defined in (2.6)) aligns extensionally with |Iω| ≤ |X| as defined in (2.5).
Sometimes in what follows we use some standard terminology for describing equivalence
relations on a set. So suppose that E is an equivalence relation on a set P . Usually in what
follows P will be the power set P (M) of some setM . Then we use [X]E = {Y ∈ P : E(X, Y )}
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as an abbreviation for the E-equivalence classes of an element X of P . Further, we use
P/E = {[X]E : X ∈ P} for the set of all equivalence classes. Finally, representatives for the
equivalence classes will be given by any injection ι : P/E → P such that E(X, ι([X]E)). More
generally, often in what follows we shall be interested in the related situation of injections
ι : P (M)/E → M . As we’ll see at the outset of the next section, this is sometimes useful for
construction models of abstraction principles.
3 The Natural Bijection
With these preliminary definitions pertaining to the background second-order logic in place,
we can now proceed to define what a model of an abstraction principle is. Suppose thatE(X, Y )
is an L0-formula with exactly two free concept variables. Let L0[∂] be the expansion of L0
by a function symbol ∂ which takes unary concepts as inputs and outputs objects. Then the
abstraction principle A[E] associated to E is as in equation (1.1) from the previous section.
By abuse of notation, we also use A[E] to refer to the theory consisting of this abstraction
principle, the full comprehension schema (2.2), the axiom of choice AC (2.7), and the global
choice schema GC (2.8). Then in contrast to equation (2.9), models of A[E] have the form:
(3.1) M = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂)
wherein ∂ : S1[M ] → M and wherein M models the full comprehension schema (2.2),
the axiom of choice (2.7), and the global choice schema GC (2.8). In the case where the
structure M from (2.9) is standard, if there is an injection ι : P (M)/E → M , then one can
build a model as in equation (3.1) by setting ∂(X) = ι([X]E). Of course, there is such an
injection if and only if |P (M)/E| ≤ |M |, which is a non-trivial assumption.
Now consider the case in which there are, within a single model, two abstraction opera-
tors which satisfy a given abstraction principle. Again suppose that E(X, Y ) is an L0-formula
with exactly two free concept variables. Let L0[∂1, ∂2] be the expansion of L0 by two function
symbols ∂1, ∂2 which takes unary concepts as inputs and outputs objects. Then the theory
A2[E] consists of the axiom (1.2) from §1, as well as the the full comprehension schema (2.2),
the axiom of choice AC (2.7), and the global choice schema GC (2.8). So models of A2[E] have
the following form:
(3.2) M = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂1, ∂2)
wherein ∂i : S1[M ]→ M andM models the full comprehension schema (2.2), the axiom of
choice AC (2.7), and the global choice schema GC (2.8).
In the description of natural relative categoricity from the earlier section, one of the key
ideas is that we restrict down to the ranges of the individual abstraction operators. Formally,
we make this precise by taking a modelM of A2[E] as in equation (3.2), and defining the
following induced L0[∂i]-structure for i = 1, 2:
(3.3) Mi = (rng(∂i), S1[M ]∩P (rng(∂i)), S2[M ]∩P (rng(∂i)2), . . . , ∂i  (S1[M ]∩P (rng(∂i))))
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Hence M 7→ M1 and M 7→ M2 are maps from an L0[∂1, ∂2]-structure M to an L0[∂i]-
structure Mi. So notationally, Mi is a structure induced from M, and not simply yet
another structure indexed by a subscript. Note that we do not include the global-well or-
der < in the signature of the induced structures Mi. This is because our natural relative
categoricity concerns isomorphisms between these structures, and we do not want to insist
that isomorphisms preserve this global well-order. This is because the global well-order is
an artifact employed to make various second-order notions like cardinality more like classical
metatheoretic notions. But of course since we’re reasoning about the induced structuresMi
as defined within the larger structureM, we can use global choice in that setting to reason
about the induced structures if we like. This disparity between the induced structuresMi
and the structureM as regards global choice does not extend to the issue of comprehension.
For, the induced structuresMi models the full comprehension schema (2.2) in its signature
simply because they are definable within the structureM which is assumed to satisfy com-
prehension in its signature. However, note that in general there is no reason that the induced
structureMi need model the abstraction principle A[E].
The notion of natural relative categoricity was defined in §1 by the condition that
the map Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(X) was an isomorphism. Before further examining the condition
that this map is an isomorphism, let us take a first and preliminary step of examining the
properties of the map itself, which we call the natural bijection. So given any model M
of A2[E] as in equation (3.2), the natural bijection Γ is the map Γ : rng(∂1) → rng(∂2)
defined by
(3.4) Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(X)
wherein X ranges over elements of S1[M ]. It then follows from the axiom (1.2) of A2[E] that
this map is well-defined and injective:
(3.5) ∂1(X) = ∂1(Y )⇐⇒ E(X, Y )⇐⇒ ∂2(X) = ∂2(Y )
Trivially, by definition, Γ : rng(∂1) → rng(∂2) is surjective and so it is indeed a bijection.
Further, the natural bijection is definable inM by the following formula:
(3.6) Γ(x) = y ⇐⇒M |= [∃ X (∂1(X) = x & ∂2(X) = y)]
So by full comprehension (2.2), the graph of the natural bijection Γ is a member of S2[M ].
Likewise, by full comprehension (2.2), if X ∈ S1[M ] ∩ P (rng(∂1)) then the following is an
element of S1[M ] ∩ P (rng(∂2)):
(3.7) Γ(X) = {Γ(x) : x ∈ X}
and similarly for n-ary relations. By abuse of notation, we also use the symbol Γ to refer to
the map Γ : M1 →M2 given by Γ on the objects and Γ as in equation (3.7) on the n-ary
relations for all n ≥ 1; and we sometimes also refer to the map Γ :M1 →M2 as the natural
bijection. This map Γ : M1 → M2 is also trivially an injection since Γ is. As is easily
verified, it is a surjection as well.
So, indeed Γ :M1 →M2 is also a bijection. For ease of future reference, let’s record
this in the following definition:
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Definition 3.1. Suppose thatM is a model of A2[E] as in equation (3.2), and thatM1,M2
are the induced structures as in equation (3.3). Then the natural bijection Γ : M1 → M2
is given by the bijection Γ : rng(∂1) → rng(∂2) defined by Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(X) for each
concept X from the ambient structure M. Further, Γ : M1 → M2 is defined on concepts
X ⊆ rng(∂1) from the ambient structure by Γ(X) = {Γ(x) : x ∈ X}, and similarly for n-ary
relations.
The various appeals to the full comprehension schema (2.2) that we made in the previous
paragraph underscore the apparent necessity of the adoption of this schema in the context of
the present discussion. For instance, to show that the graph of Γ exists as a binary concept,
we appealed to its definition in equation (3.6), which is Σ11. This is precisely the amount
of comprehension that one needs to show that Basic Law V, the abstraction principle of
Frege’s Grundgesetze, is inconsistent (cf. [Wal12] Proposition 4 p. 1682, Proposition 29 p.
1692). Hence, it seems that studying natural relative categoricity in the context of limited
comprehension would not be feasible. Before moving on, it’s worth recording one final point
in regards to the natural bijection: namely, that a routine argument establishes the following.
Proposition 3.2. If Γ :M1 →M2 is the natural bijection, then its inverse ∆ = Γ−1 is the
natural bijection ∆ :M2 →M1.
So having defined the natural bijection Γ :M1 →M2, let’s now examine carefully what
it would mean for this to be a isomorphism between the induced structures M1 and M2.
Recall that if L is an arbitrary signature, then two L-structures N1 and N2 are isomorphic
if there is a bijection γ : N1 → N2 such that for all L-formulas θ(x1, . . . , xn) and a1, . . . , an
from N1, it is the case that
(3.8) N1 |= θ(a1, . . . , an)⇐⇒ N2 |= θ(γ(a1), . . . , γ(an))
Of course, this condition is difficult to verify directly, so one usually works with the equiva-
lent condition that equation (3.8) holds in the case of atomic formulas (cf. [Mar02] Defini-
tion 1.1.3 pp. 8-9 and the proof of Theorem 1.1.10 p. 13, or [End01] p. 94 and the Homomor-
phism Theorem part (c) p. 96). For instance, consider the atomic formula θ(x1, . . . , xn, y) ≡
F (x1, . . . , xn) = y. Suppose that a1, . . . , an, b are from N1 and that FN1(a1, . . . , an) = b, so
that N1 |= θ(a1, . . . , an, b). Then equation (3.8) implies that N2 |= θ(γ(a1), . . . , γ(an), γ(b)),
or that FN2(γ(a1), . . . , γ(an)) = γ(b), which of course implies that FN2(γ(a1), . . . , γ(an)) =
γ(FN1(a1, . . . , an)). Elementary considerations such as these show that γ : N1 → N2 is an
isomorphism if and only if for all relations symbols R, constant symbols c, and function
symbols F in the signature of the structures, and all a1, . . . , an from N1, one has
RN1(a1, . . . , an) ⇐⇒ RN2(γ(a1), . . . , γ(an))(3.9)
γ(cN1) = cN2(3.10)
γ(FN1(a1, . . . , an)) = FN2(γ(a1), . . . , γ(an))(3.11)
While these considerations are admittedly elementary, it’s worth underscoring them since
they help to motivate the definition of natural relative categoricity (Definition 3.3), which
we now build towards.
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Now consider the natural bijection Γ :M1 →M2 and what it would mean for it to be
an isomorphism. Since Γ(X) = {Γ(x) : x ∈ X}, clearly one has that equation (3.9) always
holds in the case of the predication relations, which per the definition of L0 in Definition 2.1
are the only relations in the signature of L0. So Γ :M1 →M2 is an isomorphism of L0[∂]-
structures if and only if equation (3.11) holds with respect to the operator ∂. That is, the
natural bijection Γ :M1 →M2 is an isomorphism of L0[∂]-structures if and only if
(3.12) X ∈ (S1[M ] ∩ P (rng(∂1)) =⇒ Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(Γ(X))
Given the way that the natural bijection Γ was defined in equation (3.4), this happens if and
only if
(3.13) X ∈ (S1[M ] ∩ P (rng(∂1)) =⇒ ∂2(X) = ∂2(Γ(X))
which, by the fact that the modelM from equation (3.2) satisfies A2[E], holds if and only if
(3.14) M |= [∀ X (X ⊆ rng(∂1))→ E(X,Γ(X))]
Now, the natural bijection Γ :M1 →M2 is an isomorphism if and only if its inverse ∆ = Γ−1
is an isomorphism, and by Proposition 3.2 its inverse is the natural bijection ∆ :M2 →M1.
Hence, by parity of reasoning and the fact that E is an equivalence relation, one has that
Γ :M1 →M2 is an isomorphism if and only if
(3.15) M |= [∀ Y (Y ⊆ rng(∂2))→ E(Y,Γ−1(Y ))]
For ease of future reference, let us summarize these results as follows. First let’s record
our official definition of natural relative categoricity:
Definition 3.3. An abstraction principle A[E] is naturally relatively categorical if all mod-
elsM of A2[E] from equation (3.2), the natural bijection Γ :M1 →M2 from Definition 3.1
is an isomorphism of the induced structuresM1,M2 from equation (3.3).
The only way in which this formalization of the notion is more precise than the descriptions of
this notion given in §1 is that now we have formally defined the particulars of our background
second-order logic and have likewise defined the natural bijection and indicated precisely
what it takes for it to be a isomorphism.
The elementary considerations from the previous paragraphs give us a simple equivalent
characterization of natural relative categoricity. In particular, we have:
Proposition 3.4. An abstraction principle A[E] is naturally relatively categorical if and
only if all modelsM of A2[E] from equation (3.2) satisfy one of the two following equivalent
conditions:
(3.14) M |= [∀ X (X ⊆ rng(∂1))→ E(X,Γ(X))]
(3.15) M |= [∀ Y (Y ⊆ rng(∂2))→ E(Y,Γ−1(Y ))]
wherein Γ is the natural bijection (cf. Definition 3.1).
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Expressed in these terms, natural relative categoricity is patently a deductive property of
the theory A2[E].
In the next section we’ll prove Theorem 1.1 which gives a characterization of natural
relative categoricity in terms of cardinality coarsening on abstracts (1.3) and injection in-
variance on abstracts (1.4). In the previous section we’ve formally defined our background
second-order logic and so we can be a bit more precise now about the content of these con-
ditions. Recall that A[E] may be used as the abbreviation for the theory consisting of the
abstraction principle (1.1) in addition to the full comprehension schema (2.2), the axiom
of choice (2.7), and the global choice schema (2.8). Then officially, we say that A[E] is
cardinality coarsening on abstracts if the following is a theorem of A[E]:
(1.3) ∀ X, Y ((Y ≈ X & X ⊆ rng(∂))→ E(X, Y ))]
Likewise, officially A[E] is injection invariant on abstracts if the following is a theorem of
A[E]:
(1.4) ∀ injection ι : V→V ∀ X ⊆ rng(∂) E(X, ι(X))
So both cardinality coarsening on abstracts and injection invariance on abstracts are, by
definition, deductive properties of the theory A[E]. By contrast, as was made clear by
Proposition 3.4 of the previous paragraph, natural relative categoricity is a deductive prop-
erty of the theory A2[E]. So one of the implications of Theorem 1.1, which establishes the
equivalence of these notions, is that we’re able to further reduce natural relative categoricity
to a deductive property of the theory A[E] as opposed to A2[E].
Before setting up the particulars of our second main theorem, let’s record for reference
when an isomorphism H : M1 → M2 is equal to the natural bijection Γ : M1 → M2.
It’s natural to focus attention on those isomorphisms H : M1 → M2 whose restriction
H  rng(∂1) is an element of S2[M ], since it is only with respect to these that we can define
further elements ofM in terms of H and H by recourse to the comprehension schema (2.2).
By a routine argument, we can establish the following:
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that M is a model of A2[E] with induced structures M1 and
M2. Suppose that H : M1 → M2 is a map whose restriction H  rng(∂1) to rng(∂1)
is an element of S2[M ]. Then H : M1 → M2 is isomorphism if and only if one has
M |= [∀ X (X ⊆ rng(∂1)→ E(X,H(X))].
As a corollary to Theorem 1.1, we will establish in the next section that such isomorphisms
are always equal to the natural bijection in the setting of natural relative categoricity (cf.
Corollary 4.1).
Finally, let’s briefly say something about the content of our second main Theorem 1.2.
For ease of future reference, let’s record the official notion in the following definition:
Definition 3.6. An abstraction principle A[E] is surjectively relatively categorical if all
models M of A2[E] from (3.2) wherein the abstraction operators ∂i : S1[M ] → M are
surjective, the natural bijection Γ :M1 →M2 from Definition 3.1 is an isomorpism of the
induced structuresM1,M2 from equation (3.3).
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So clearly natural relative categoricity implies surjective relative categoricity. For an exam-
ple of an abstraction principle which is surjectively relatively categorical but not naturally
relatively categorical, see the example of the Bicardinality Principle in §5. In the statement
of Theorem 1.2, the key notions were that of permutation invariance (1.5) and bicardinality
coarsening (1.6). In the context of Theorem 1.2, it is understood that to say an abstraction
principle A[E] has one of these properties is to say that these properties are deducible from
the supposition that (i) the abstraction operator is a surjection as well as from (ii) the ab-
straction principle itself, the full comprehension schema (2.2), the axiom of choice (2.7), and
the global choice schema GC (2.8).
4 The Equivalent Characterizations
The goal of this section is to establish Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2. The first provides
an equivalent characterization of natural relative categoricity in terms of cardinality coars-
ening on abstracts (1.3) and injective invariance on abstracts (1.4). The second provides
an equivalent characterization of surjectively relatively categoricity in terms of bicardinality
coarsening (1.6) and permutation invariance (1.5). These theorems gives us two qualitatively
distinct means by which to identify and recognize our versions of relative categoricity. For,
in and of themselves, natural relative categoricity and surjective relative categoricity (Defini-
tion 3.3 and Definition 3.6) are claims about determining a single structure. But the notions
of injection invariance on abstracts (1.4) and permutation invariance (1.5) deal in a different
currency: these conditions say say that a certain second-order relation should be invariant
under certain mappings of the entire domain. Cardinality coarsening on abstracts (1.3) and
bicardinality coarsening (1.6) are different still: they are more local in character and concern
the comparative sizes of a concept (and its relative complement).
Here is then the proof of Theorem 1.1:
Proof. First suppose that A[E] is naturally relatively categorical. Suppose that M∗ =
(M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂1) is an arbitrary model of A[E]. Note that V = {x : x = x} (2.3)
as interpreted on M∗ is exactly M . So with an eye towards showing injection invariance
on abstracts, suppose that ι : M → M is an injection whose graph is in S2[M ]. Then
define ∂2 : S1[M ] → M by ∂2 = ι ◦ ∂1. Note that since ι : M → M is an injection, we have
that the following holds inM:
(4.1) ∂2(X) = ∂2(Y )⇐⇒ ∂1(X) = ∂1(Y )⇐⇒ E(X, Y )
Hence, since ∂2 isM∗-definable, the following structure is a model of A2[E]:
(4.2) M = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂1, ∂2)
Since by hypothesis A[E] is naturally relatively categorical, we have that the natural bijec-
tion Γ :M1 →M2 is an isomorphism. Then by definition of Γ in equation (3.4), we have that
X ∈ S1[M ] implies Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(X) = ι(∂1(X)). Hence Γ = ι  (rng(∂1)). Now we may fi-
nally finish verifying injection invariance on abstracts. Suppose thatX ∈ S1[M ]∩P (rng(∂1)).
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Then Γ(X) = ι(X). Hence from Proposition 3.4 (and in particular equation (3.14)) we may
infer that E(X,Γ(X)) and hence E(X, ι(X)).
Second suppose A[E] is injection invariant on abstracts. To show that A[E] is naturally
relatively categorical, suppose that
(4.3) M = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂1, ∂2)
is a model of A2[E]. So we must show that the natural bijection Γ : M1 → M2 is an
isomorphism. By Cardinal Comparability (2.10),
(4.4) |M \ rng(∂1)| ≤ |M \ rng(∂2)| or |M \ rng(∂2)| ≤ |M \ rng(∂1)|
First suppose that |M \ rng(∂1)| ≤ |M \ rng(∂2)|. Then let ∆ : M \ rng(∂1)→ M \ rng(∂2)
be a witnessing injection. Define an injection ι : M →M by
(4.5) ι  rng(∂1) = Γ, ι  (M \ rng(∂1)) = ∆
Since Γ has range rng(∂2) and ∆ has range M \ rng(∂2), the map ι : M → M is indeed
an injection. Now, we verify natural relative categoricity by verifying equation (3.14). So
suppose that X ∈ (S1[M ] ∩ P (rng(∂1)). Then by injection invariance on abstracts applied
to ι, we have thatM |= E(X, ι(X)). But since X ⊆ rng(∂1), we have that ι(X) = Γ(X), so
that M |= E(X,Γ(X)). Hence, we have finished verifying natural relative categoricity via
equation (3.14).
Conversely, suppose that |M \ rng(∂2)| ≤ |M \ rng(∂1)| with witnessing injection ∆ :
M \ rng(∂2)→M \ rng(∂1). Define an injection ι : M →M by
(4.6) ι  rng(∂2) = Γ−1, ι  (M \ rng(∂2)) = ∆
Since Γ−1 has range rng(∂1) and ∆ has range M \ rng(∂1), the map ι : M → M is indeed
an injection. Now, we verify natural relative categoricity by verifying equation (3.15). So
suppose that Y ∈ (S1[M ] ∩ P (rng(∂2)). Then by injection invariance on abstracts applied
to ι, we have thatM |= E(Y, ι(Y )). But since Y ⊆ rng(∂2), we have that ι(Y ) = Γ−1(Y ),
so thatM |= E(Y,Γ−1(Y )). Hence, we have finished verifying natural relative categoricity
via equation (3.15).
Having shown the equivalence of natural relative categoricity and injection invariance
on abstracts, we now show that these are equivalent to cardinality coarsening on abstracts.
First, note that cardinality coarsening on abstracts trivially implies injection invariance on
abstracts. For, suppose that we’re working in a model of A[E] and there’s an injection ι :
V → V and X ⊆ rng(∂1). Then let Y = ι(X), so that Y ≈ X and X ⊆ rng(∂1). Then by
cardinality coarsening on abstracts, we have E(X, Y ), which is just to say E(X, ι(X)), so
that we have verified injection invariance on abstracts.
Now assume that A[E] is injection invariant on abstracts. Consider a model M∗ =
(M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂1) ofA[E], and suppose thatX0, Y0 are members of S1[M ] with Y0 ≈
X0 and X0 ⊆ rng(∂1). We must show that E(X0, Y0). There are several cases to consider,
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which for the sake of readability, we enumerate separately. For the abbreviations of cardi-
nality notions which we employ here, see in particular (2.4)-(2.6) from §2.
Case I: |Y0| = |X0| = |V |. Then V ≈ X0 ⊆ rng(∂1) ⊆ V implies that |rng(∂1)| = |V |.
Choose a bijection pi : rng(∂1)→ V and define a map ∂2 : S1[M ]→M by ∂2(X) = pi(∂1(X)),
so that since pi : rng(∂1)→ V is a surjection, we have that rng(∂2) = V . Then observe that
for any X, Y we have the following inM∗ since pi is an injection:
(4.7) ∂2(X) = ∂2(Y )⇐⇒ ∂1(X) = ∂1(Y )⇐⇒ E(X, Y )
Hence, the structureM† = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂2) is likewise a model of A[E], and so
by injection invariance on abstracts we have
(4.8) M† |= [∀ injection ι : V→V ∀ X ⊆ rng(∂2) E(X, ι(X))]
But since rng(∂2) = V , this can be simplified to:
(4.9) M† |= [∀ injection ι : V→V ∀ X E(X, ι(X))]
Now, since Y0 ≈ X0 ≈ V , choose bijections j1 : V → X0 and j2 : V → Y0. Then by
the previous equation, we have E(V, j1(V )) and E(V, j2(V )), or what is the same E(V,X0)
and E(V, Y0). Since E is an equivalence relation, we have that E(X0, Y0), which was to be
demonstrated.
Case II: |Y0| = |X0| < |V | & |V | < ω. By Cardinal Comparability (2.10),
(4.10) |V \X0| ≤ |V \ Y0| or |V \ Y0| ≤ |V \X0|
First suppose that |V \X0| ≤ |V \ Y0|. Choose injection ι : V → V such that ι  X0 : X0 →
Y0 is a bijection and ι  (V \X0) : V \X0 → V \Y0 is an injection. Then since A[E] is injection
invariant on abstracts, we have that E(X0, ι(X0)), which is the same as E(X0, Y0). Second
suppose that |V \ Y0| ≤ |V \X0|. Choose injection j : V → V such that j  Y0 : Y0 → X0 is
a bijection and j  (V \ Y0) : V \ Y0 → V \X0 is an injection. Since |V | < ω, we have that
the injection j : V → V is actually a bijection. Let ι = j−1, so that ι : V → V is a bijection
and ι(X0) = Y0. Then by injection invariance on abstracts, we again have E(X0, ι(X0))
or E(X0, Y0).
Case III: |Y0| = |X0| < |V | & |V | ≥ ω. Then by Infinite Sums are Maxs (2.11), our case
assumptions imply that |V | = max{|V \X0| , |X0|} = |V \X0| and |V | = max{|V \ Y0| , |Y0|} =
|V \ Y0|. Hence, trivially one has that |V \X0| ≤ |V \ Y0|. Choose injection ι : V → V such
that ι  X0 : X0 → Y0 is a bijection and ι  (V \X0) : V \X0 → V \ Y0 is an injection. Then
since A[E] is injection invariant on abstracts, we have that E(X0, ι(X0)), which is the same
as E(X0, Y0).
Finally, let’s note an instructive corollary to Theorem 1.1. This corollary tells us that
in the context of natural relative categoricity, the only definable isomorphisms between the
induced structures are identical to the natural bijection:
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Corollary 4.1. Suppose that A[E] is naturally relatively categorical. Suppose that M is
a model of A2[E] with induced structuresM1 andM2. Suppose that H : M1 → M2 is a
map whose restriction H  rng(∂1) to rng(∂1) is an element of S2[M ]. If H : M1 →M2 is
an isomorphism, then it is equal to the natural bijection Γ :M1 →M2.
Proof. So suppose that H :M1 →M2 is an isomorphism. To show that H is equal to the
natural bijection Γ :M1 →M2, it suffices by Proposition 3.5 to show that
(4.11) M |= [∀ X (X ⊆ rng(∂1)→ E(X,H(X))]
Suppose that X ⊆ rng(∂1), and let Y = H(X), so that Y ≈ X and X ⊆ rng(∂1). Since
A[E] is naturally relatively categorical, by Theorem 1.1 it is cardinality coarsening on ab-
stracts (1.3), from which we can infer E(X, Y ), which is the same as E(X,H(X)), so that
indeed the previous equation is satisfied.
Let’s turn now to the proof of our other main theorem, namely, Theorem 1.2:
Proof. First suppose that A[E] is surjectively relatively categorical (cf. Definition 3.6).
Suppose that (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂1) is a model of A[E] where ∂1 : S1[M ] → M is a
surjection, and suppose that pi : M → M is a bijection. Let ∂2 : S1[M ]→ M be defined by
∂2 = pi ◦ ∂1. Then since pi : M →M is an injection, we have that the following holds in our
model:
(4.12) ∂2(X) = ∂2(Y )⇐⇒ ∂1(X) = ∂1(Y )⇐⇒ E(X, Y )
HenceM = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , <, ∂1, ∂2) is a model of A2[E]. Further, since pi : M →M
is an surjection, we have that ∂2 : S1[M ]→M is a surjection. Then since by the hypothesis
of A[E] being surjectively relatively categorical, we have that the natural bijection Γ :M1 →
M2 is an isomorphism of the induced structures (cf. equation (3.3)). Then by surjective
relative categoricity (cf. equation (3.14)), we have that M models E(X,Γ(X)) for any
X ∈ S1[M ]. But for any X ∈ S1[M ], one may use the surjectivity of the operators to check
that pi(X) = Γ(X), which of course implies that E(X, pi(X)), so that we are done.
Now suppose that A[E] plus the surjectivity of the abstraction operator proves permu-
tation invariance (1.5). Then we show that A[E] is surjectively relatively categorical. So
suppose thatM is a model of A2[E] wherein ∂1, ∂2 are surjective. Then the natural bijection
is a bijection Γ : V → V . Then by permutation invariance (1.5), we have that E(X,Γ(X))
for all X. Then by equation (3.14), we have that Γ :M1 →M2 is an isomorphism.
So we’ve shown that surjective relative categoricity is equivalent to permutation invari-
ance, assuming that the abstraction operator is surjective. Now we show that these two
conditions are equivalent to the condition of bicardinality coarsening, under the hypothesis
that the abstraction operator is surjective. First suppose that that A[E] plus the surjectivity
of the abstraction operator proves permutation invariance (1.5). Then suppose that X, Y
such that |X| = |Y | and |V \X| = |V \ Y |. Any two witnessing bijections can be conjoined
into a bijection pi : V → V such that pi(X) = Y and pi(V \X) = V \Y . Then by permutation
invariance (1.5), we have that E(X, pi(X)) or E(X, Y ), which is what we wanted to establish.
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Finally, suppose that A[E] plus the surjectivity of the abstraction operator proves bicardi-
nality coarsening (1.6). Suppose that pi : V → V is a bijection. Let X be a concept and let
Y = pi(X). Then since pi is a bijection, we have that |X| = |Y | and |V \X| = |V \ Y |. So
by bicardinality coarsening (1.6), it follows that E(X, Y ) or E(X, pi(X)).
In analogue to Corollary 4.1, we have the following result showing that the only isomor-
phism is the natural bijection in the setting of surjective relative categoricity. We omit the
proof since it is entirely analogous to the proof of the this earlier corollary.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that A[E] is surjectively relatively categorical. Suppose that M
is a model of A2[E], where the abstraction operators are surjective, with induced structures
M1 andM2. Suppose that H :M1 →M2 is a map whose restriction H  rng(∂1) to rng(∂1)
is an element of S2[M ]. If H :M1 →M2 is an isomorphism, then it is equal to the natural
bijection Γ :M1 →M2.
So the equivalent characterizations featuring in Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 concern
the abstraction principle A[E]. It will be useful to have analogues of these for the underlying
equivalence relations E as well. So we define:
(4.13) Injection Invariant : |= [∀ injection ι : V→V ∀ X E(X, ι(X))]
(4.14) Permutation Invariant : |= [∀ bijection pi : V→V ∀ X E(X, pi(X))]
(4.15) Cardinality Coarsening : |= [∀ X, Y (|X| = |Y | → E(X, Y ))]
(4.16) Bicardinality Coarsening : |= [∀ X, Y ((|X| = |Y | & |V \X| = |V \ Y |)→ E(X, Y ))]
(4.17) Injection Invariant on Small Concepts :
|= [∀ injection ι : V→V ∀ X (|X| ≤ |P (V )/E| → E(X, ι(X)))]
(4.18) Cardinality Coarsening on Small Concepts :
|= [∀ X, Y (|Y | = |X| ≤ |P (V )/E| → E(X, Y ))]
In the statements of these notions, the |= relation is the deduction relation from the deduction
system of second-order logic which is the background of all our theories. In the final two
conditions (4.17)-(4.18), the clause |X| ≤ |P (V )/E| just means that there’s an injection fromX
to the E-equivalence classes of second-order objects. This can be written in second-order
logic as follows:
(4.19) ∃ R ∀ x, y ∈ X (x 6= y → ¬E(R[x], R[y]))
wherein R is a binary relation and where R[x] = {z : Rxz}. These conditions (4.13)-(4.18)
are all conditions on an arbitrary formula E(X, Y ), which we assume to be an L0-formula
(cf. Definition 2.1) which is provably an equivalence relation in our background second-order
logic.
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In diagrammatic form, the relationship between these notions are displayed in Figure 1.
In the figure, the arrows going in both directions– i.e. “↔”– indicate a provable equiva-
lence, while the double-lined arrows that go in only one direction– i.e. “⇒”– indicate that
the implication cannot be reversed. The implications between e.g. injection invariance and
cardinality coarsening follows automatically from the analogous part of the proof of Theo-
rem 1.1. The only implications in Figure 1 that are less immediate are the implications from
the conditions in the middle column to the conditions in the far-right column. So let’s show
that if E is cardinality coarsening on small concepts then A[E] is cardinality coarsening on
abstracts. To see this, it suffices to note that the Axiom of Choice AC (2.7) implies that
(4.20) |rng(∂)| ≤ |P (V )/E|
For, for each x from rng(∂) there is X such that ∂(X) = x. Then by AC (2.7), there is R such
that for all x from rng(∂) one has that ∂(R[x]) = x, where R[x] = {y : Rxy} which exists
by comprehension. Then suppose that x 6= y are both from rng(∂) but E(R[x], R[y]). Then
by A[E] we have x = ∂(R[x]) = ∂(R[y]) = y, a contradiction. So indeed we have (4.20).
Let us end this section by discussing the witnessing counterexamples featuring in Fig-
ure 1. For an example of an E which is bicardinality coarsening but not cardinality coars-
ening, see the discussion of the Bicardinality Principle in §5. There are different kinds of
witnessing counterexamples which show that the conditions on A[E] don’t imply the anal-
ogous conditions on E. One way to see this is to consider A[E] which are inconsistent.
For instance, take E0(X, Y ) ≡ X = Y . Then A[E0] is just the abstraction principle Ba-
sic Law V from Frege’s Grundgesetze, and as we noted earlier this is inconsistent with full
comprehension (which we are assuming in this paper). Since the conditions on A[E] are
conditions on derivability in A[E], trivially the inconsistent A[E0] satisfies all of these. One
might hope that the right-most arrows could be reversed with the additional assumption of
the consistency of A[E]. But this is not the case. For consider
(4.21) E(X, Y ) ≡ (|V | < ω & X = Y ) ∨ (|V | ≥ ω & X ≈ Y )
Again, for our abbreviations of cardinality-related notions, see (2.4)-(2.6) from §2. So on
finite domains, E acts like E0. But for |V | ≥ ω, E is just equinumerosity. The principle A[E]
is also naturally relatively categorical, since A[E] only has models with infinite first-order
domains, and in those models, E acts exactly like equinumerosity, which we showed to be
naturally relatively categorical in the earlier paper ([Wal12] Proposition 14 p. 1687; see also
§5). However, E is not cardinality coarsening on small concepts (or bicardinality coarsening),
since if 1 < |V | < ω and a 6= b are distinct objects then one has that ¬E({a}, {b}).
Second, let’s show that cardinality coarsening on small concepts does not imply cardi-
nality coarsening. First define the auxiliary formula:
(4.22) θ(X, Y ) ≡ |X| = |Y | ∧ [(X 6= V & Y 6= V ) ∨ (X = V & Y = V )]
Consider then the following equivalence relation E:
E(X, Y ) ≡ |V | = ω1 → [(|X| = |V | ∨ |Y | = |V |)→ θ(X, Y )]
∧ |V | = ω1 → [(|X| < |V | ∨ |Y | < |V |)→ |X| = |Y |]
∧ |V | 6= ω1 → |X| = |Y |(4.23)
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Intuitively, this says that if the domain V is the first uncountable cardinal, then V is the only
member of its own equivalence class, while all the other concepts of the same cardinality as V
form an equivalence class, and then properly smaller concepts are separated into equivalence
classes according to cardinality; while if the domain V is any other size, then all the concepts
are separated into equivalence classes according to cardinality. Note that |V | = ω1 can be
written in second-order logic in a standard way: for, since we have global choice in the
background, it simply consists in the claim that the global well-order of V has a limit point,
and that any initial segment of the global well-order is bijective with the initial segment
corresponding to the first limit point, but that V itself is not bijective with this initial
segment.
Let’s verify that this E from (4.23) is cardinality coarsening on small concepts but not
cardinality coarsening. For the former, there are two cases to consider. First suppose that
the domain V has cardinality ω1. Then by construction |P (V )/E| = ω. Suppose that |Y | =
|X| ≤ ω. Then by definition E(X, Y ) since E is sameness of cardinality on smaller concepts.
Second suppose that the domain of V is any other cardinality. Then by construction E is
just sameness of cardinality and so we are done. Now, let us note that E is not cardinality
coarsening. For, consider a model where the domain V has size ω1. Consider Y0 = V
and X0 = Y0 \ {y0}, where y0 is any element of Y0 = V . Then by construction we have
that ¬E(X0, Y0), while they of course have the same cardinality.
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Figure 1: Provability Relation Among Conditions on E and A[E]
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5 Some Examples and Non-Examples
In this section, we give some examples and non-examples of naturally relatively categorical
abstraction principles. In the case of abstraction principles which are not naturally relatively
categorical, we have always been able to find a single sentence which illustrates this. So we
define:
Definition 5.1. The abstraction principle A[E] is relatively elementary equivalent if when-
ever M is a model of A2[E] as in equation (3.2), then for any sentence ϕ in the signature
L0[∂] of the induced structuresMi from equation (3.3) one has thatM1 |= ϕ if and only if
M2 |= ϕ. If A[E] is not relatively elementarily equivalent, then a sentence ϕ of L0[∂] such
that there is a model M of A2[E] with M1 |= ϕ and M2 |= ¬ϕ (or vice-versa) is called a
witness to the failure of relative elementary equivalence.
Further, note that natural relative categoricity trivially implies relative elementary equiv-
alence. Prior to stepping into the examples, let us mention that there’s an obvious sense
in which relative elementarily equivalence is a more apposite formalization of determinacy
of truth-value ideas than natural relative categoricity itself. However, it seems difficult to
study relative elementarily equivalence directly, and so we study natural relative categoricity
instead, since it is the obvious sufficient condition for relative elementarily equivalence in
this setting. It is not even obvious to us whether these notions are distinct in the setting of
abstraction principles:
Question 5.2. Suppose that E(X, Y ) is an L0-formula which is provably an equivalence
relation in our background second-order logic and such that A[E] is consistent. Suppose
further that A[E] is relatively elementarily equivalent. Is it necessarily the case that A[E] is
naturally relatively categorical?
One suspects that the answer to this question is ‘no,’ but we have been unable to produce a
counterexample.
Hume’s Principle
Recall that Hume’s Principle is the abstraction principle associated to the equivalence re-
lation of equinumerosity. In [Wal12] Proposition 14 p. 1687, it was shown that Hume’s
Principle is naturally relatively categorical. In that paper, the result was established by
hand. But with our main Theorem 1.1 now in place, we can reduce this to the one-line
observation that equinumerosity is trivially cardinality coarsening on abstracts.
Boolos’ New V
In his [Boo89], Boolos drew attention to the following equivalence relation:
(5.1) E(X, Y ) ≡ (|X| < |V | ∨ |Y | < |V |)→ X = Y
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Intuitively, this equivalence identifies all the concepts bijective with the universe V , but acts
like Basic Law V on small concepts. By Theorem 1.1, it’s easy to see that this equivalence
relation is not naturally relatively categorical. For, it is trivially not cardinality coarsening
on abstracts. Indeed, any two distinct small concepts which are equinumerous will not
be equivalent under this equivalence relation. Further, it turns out that New V is not
relatively elementarily equivalent (5.1), and that the witnessing sentence was previously
studied by Jané and Uzquiano [JU04]. For, they noted that some models of New V generated
membership relations which were well-founded while others did not.
To see this, enumerate the finite subsets of ω as X1, X2, X3, . . ., and without loss of
generality, suppose that 1 ∈ X1. Then let ∂1 : P (ω)→ ω be any surjection that sends all the
infinite subsets of ω to 0, and sends X1 to 1. Further, let ∂2 : P (ω) → ω be the surjective
map that sends all the infinite subsets of ω to 0, and acts on the finite subsets of ω as follows:
(5.2) ∂2(Xi) = min(ω \ (Xi ∪ {0, ∂(X1), . . . , ∂(Xi-1)}))
Then M = (ω, P (ω), P (ω × ω), . . . , ∂1, ∂2) is model of A2[E] (1.2). Since both maps are
surjective, we have that the induced structures Mi from equation (3.3) will satisfy Mi =
(ω, P (ω), P (ω × ω), . . . , ∂i).
If A[E] were naturally relatively categorical, then A[E] would be relatively elementarily
equivalent. But let ϕ be the following sentence in the signature of L0[∂]:
(5.3) ϕ ≡ ∃ X ∃ b (|X| < |V | & b = ∂(X) & Xb)
Then it’s easy to see thatM1 |= ϕ since b = ∂1(X1) is a witness. However, by construction,
M2 |= ¬ϕ. So ϕ is a witness to the failure of relative elementarily equivalence of New V, so
that New V is not naturally relatively categorical. Boolos was interested in New V because
it allowed one to define an ersatz membership relation:
(5.4) aηb⇐⇒ ∃ X (|X| < |V | & ∂(X) = b & Xa)
Expressed in these terms, ϕ from (5.3) says that there’s a b with bηb, which intuitively says
that the membership relation from (5.4) is not well-founded.
Bicardinality
Consider the equivalence relation:
(5.5) E(X, Y ) ≡ |X| = |Y | ∧ |V \X| = |V \ Y |
It’s easy to see that this is provably an equivalence relation in our background second-order
logic. Further, this equivalence relation is trivially an example of an equivalence relation
which is bicardinality coarsening but not cardinality coarsening, since for instance in infinite
structures V and V \ {a} will have the same cardinality but will not be E-equivalent. Let’s
call the associated principle A[E] the Bicardinality Principle. By Theorem 1.2, we have that
the Bicardinality Principle is surjectively relatively categorical. However, it turns out that
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the Bicardinality Principle is not relatively elementarily equivalent, and hence not naturally
relatively categorical.
The non-relative elementary equivalence of the Bicardinality Principle is related to
the different ways this principle can interpret the natural numbers. Just as with Hume’s
Principle, the Bicardinality Principle allows one to build a copy of the natural numbers
{0, 1, . . . , n, n+1 . . .} by setting 0 = ∂(∅) and n+1 = ∂({0, . . . , n}). But the Bicardinality
principle allows one to build a second copy {0̂, 1̂, . . . , n̂, n̂+1 . . .} of the natural numbers by
setting 0̂ = ∂(V ) and n̂+1 = ∂(V \ {0̂, . . . , n̂}). Then we can define the following sentences
for each n > 0:
(5.6) ϕn ≡
n−1∧
m=0
m 6= n, ϕ̂n ≡
n−1∧
m=0
m̂ 6= n̂,
Then one has that the Bicardinality Principle proves each ϕn and each ϕ̂n. The proof is very
similar to the proof that Hume’s Principle proves the variant ψn of ϕn wherein n is defined in
terms of # instead of ∂ (where again, # is the symbol reserved for the abstraction operator
featuring in Hume’s Principle). Indeed, the sentences ψn are part of the means by which one
establishes the principle Nq mentioned in the introduction §1 (cf. [Wal14b] equation (34) p.
111).
However, we have that ϕ̂n for each n > 0 is a witness to the Bicardinality Principle
being not relatively elementarily equivalent. Consider a model of the Bicardinality Principle
of the form
(5.7) M∗ = (ω, P (ω), P (ω2), . . . , ∂1)
wherein ∂1 : P (ω) → ω is a surjection (cf. Proposition 6.4). Define the injection ι : ω → ω
by ι(n) = 2n, and define ∂2 = ι ◦ ∂1. Then by an argument with which we are now familiar
(cf. equations (4.7) and (4.12)), we have that the following is also a model of A2[E]:
(5.8) M = (ω, P (ω), P (ω2), . . . , ∂1, ∂2)
Since ∂1 is surjective, we have that the induced structureM1 from equation (3.3) is identical
to the structureM∗ from (5.7), and soM1 models ϕ̂1 since it is a model of the Bicardinality
Principle. However, if E denotes the evens, then we have that the induced structureM2 is
equal to the following structure
(5.9) M2 = (E , P (E), P (E2), . . . , ∂2  P (E))
Then let D = E\{∂2(E)}. Then D, E have cardinality ω, as do the their relative complements
ω \D,ω \ E in ω. Hence sinceM models the Bicardinality Principle, we have that ∂2(E) =
∂2(D). But this implies that on M2, we have that 0̂ = 1̂, so that M2 does not model ϕ̂1.
The same argument works for ϕ̂n for all n ≥ 1.
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The Nuisance Principle
Consider the equivalence relation E(X, Y ) ≡ |X4Y | < ω wherein X4Y denotes the sym-
metric difference X4Y = (X \ Y ) ∪ (Y \ X). In this, recall that the notion of |Z| < ω is
that of Dedekind-finiteness (2.6), so that E is L0-definable. But per Proposition 2.2, this
aligns with the notion of being finite in the sense of being bijective with the initial segments
Ia = {x : x < a} from our global well-order where a is finite, i.e. is less than the first
limit point. So while E is expressible purely in terms of the signature of the background
second-order logic L0 (cf. Definition 2.1), we can use the global well-order to show that it is
an equivalence relation. For, using the global well-order we can show that the union of any
two finite sets is finite, and so the transitivity of E follows from X4Z ⊆ (X4Y )∪ (Y4Z).
The abstraction principleA[E] has been called the “Nuisance Principle” followingWright’s
identification of its abstracts as “nuisances” [Wri97], and is related to an earlier principle pre-
sented by Boolos [Boo90]. Let’s show that A[E] is naturally relatively categorical, and let’s
begin with the following proposition. This proposition is well-known if one assumes the stan-
dard semantics, but we know of no extant proof for the Henkin semantics with choice prin-
ciples. In the statement of this theorem, the notion of finiteness is Dedekind-finiteness (2.6)
or the aforementioned equivalent characterization (cf. again Proposition 2.2).
Proposition 5.3. A[E] implies that V is finite.
Proof. So suppose not. Then let’s work deductively in the theory A[E] under the assumption
that the universe V is infinite. Let ω denote the least limit point in the global well-order.
First let’s establish that there’s a way to enumerate all finite concepts:
Claim 5.4. There is a ternary relation R such that for all X, |X| < ω if and only if there
is a < ω and b such that R[a, b] = X, where again R[a, b] = {c : R(a, b, c)}.
This claim follows trivially by comprehension from the following claim:
Claim 5.5. There is a ternary relation R such that for all a < ω, and all X with |X| ≤ |Ia|
there is b with R[a, b] = X, where again R[a, b] = {c : R(a, b, c)}.
This claim of course follows from the following claim by a single application of AC (2.7):
Claim 5.6. For all a < ω there is binary relation Ra such that for all X with |X| ≤ |Ia|
there is b with Ra[b] = X.
We argue for this latter claim by induction on a. For a = 0, it holds trivially since we may
choose Ra equal to the empty binary concept. Now suppose it holds for a0 with witness Ra0 ,
and suppose a = s(a0), where this is the partial successor operation from (2.14). By Infinite
Products are Maxs (2.12), there is a bijection 〈·, ·〉 : V × V → V . Then we define the binary
relation Ra as follows:
(5.10) Ra[b] = {z : ∃ b0, c0 b = 〈b0, c0〉 & (z = c0 ∨Ra0 [b0](z))}
So this finishes the proof of Claim 5.6 and with it the proof of Claim 5.4.
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Using this enumeration of the finite concepts, let’s define a partial injective map from
finite concepts to objects. For this, let us fix a ternary relation R as in Claim 5.4. Then
consider the following partial map from concepts to objects:
(5.11) ∇(X) = c⇐⇒ |X| < ω & c = min
<
{〈a, b〉 : a < ω & R[a, b] = X}
Then this map is defined on all finite concepts, and on these, it is an injection. For, supposing
that ∇(X) = 〈a, b〉 = ∇(Y ), we have X = R[a, b] = Y . Hence, indeed ∇ is a partial map
from concepts to objects which is defined and injective on finite concepts.
So now consider rng(∂), where ∂ as usual is the abstraction operator associated to A[E].
As in the argument for (4.20) in the previous section, we may use AC (2.7) to show that there
is a binary relation S such that for all x from rng(∂) one has that ∂(S[x]) = x. Then for
all concepts X, there is unique x from rng(∂) such that E(X,S[x]). Hence there are finite
concepts FX , GX such that X = (S[x] ∪ FX) \ GX . Then define a map ∂′ from concepts to
objects by ∂′(X) = 〈x, 〈a, b〉〉 iff x is from rng(∂) and E(X,S[x]) and
(5.12) 〈a, b〉 = min
<
{〈c, d〉 : ∃ FX , GX X = (S[x] ∪ FX) \GX & ∇(FX) = c & ∇(GX) = d}
Then by construction ∂′ is an injection from concepts to objects, and so using the full
comprehension schema, we may again replicate the Russell paradox to derive a contradiction.
Using this result, we can now deduce:
Proposition 5.7. A[E] is naturally relatively categorical.
Proof. Let’s work within A[E]. By the above result, V is finite. Hence, since |X4Y | < ω for
all finite X and Y , we have that E(X, Y ) for all X, Y . And then trivially A[E] is cardinality
coarsening on abstracts. Hence by Theorem 1.1, A[E] is naturally relatively categorical.
So this proof shows us that naturally relatively categorical abstraction principles are not
pairwise consistent. For, as noted earlier, Hume’s Principle is naturally relatively categorical
and yet it implies that V is infinite, since for instance when one defines the natural num-
bers using the resources of Hume’s Principle, they will be Dedekind-infinite. But of course
one would not have expected relatively categorical concepts to be pairwise consistent. For
instance, the standard relative categoricity argument for set theory can be deployed to show
that the standard axioms plus “there are no inaccessibles”, as well as the standard axioms
plus “there are inaccessibles,” are both relatively categorical, at least assuming (as we are
here) that the domain of the model is the entire universe. In §6, we’ll note by contrast that
equivalence relations which are cardinality coarsening on small concepts are pairwise consis-
tent. So this is another way of seeing that the conditions on A[E] in Figure 1 don’t have
implications for the analogous conditions on E: while the Nuisance Principle is naturally
relatively categorical and hence cardinality coarsening on abstracts, it is not the case that
the underlying equivalence relation is cardinality coarsening on small concepts.
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The Complementation Principle
Let’s say that a concept X is a complement, abbreviated Cmp(X) if there is Y ≈ X such
that X unionsq Y = V . Then we define:
(5.13) E(X, Y ) ≡ (Cmp(X) ∨ Cmp(Y ))→ (X = Y ∨ (X ≈ Y & X unionsq Y = V ))
This equivalence relation sorts out concepts as follows: each pair of equinumerous comple-
mentary sets constitute a separate equivalence class, everything else occupies a single “junk”
equivalence class.
This abstraction principle has finite models only for odd domains, and domains of sizes
2 and 4. For, in the case of odd domains, there are no complements and so there is only
one equivalence class. In the case of even domains of size 2n, the number of E-equivalence
classes is exactly f(n) = 1
2
(
2n
n
)
+ 1, and one has that f(1) = 2, f(2) = 4 and f(n) ≥ 2n + 1
for n ≥ 3, as one can establish by induction on n.
Unlike the Nuisance Principle, this A[E] is not naturally relatively categorical and indeed
not relatively elementary equivalent. For, consider the domain M = {a, b, c, d} of size 4,
where there are exactly 4 equivalence classes. Define two abstraction operators by
(5.14) ∂1({a, b}) = a, ∂1({a, c}) = b, ∂1({a, d}) = c, ∂1(∅) = d,
∂2({a, b}) = c, ∂2({a, c}) = b, ∂2({a, d}) = a, ∂2(∅) = d
This determines a modelM of A2[E] with first-order part M . Then consider the sentence:
(5.15) ∀X [|X| = 2→ ∃Y (E(X, Y ) ∧ Y (∂i(X)) ∧ Y (∂i(∅))]
This sentence fails in M1 with witness X = {a, b} but holds in M2. Hence A[E] is not
relatively elementary equivalent and hence not naturally relatively categorical. But like with
the Nuisance Principle, A[E] proves V is finite. Hence, it is not this feature alone which
permitted the Nuisance Principle to be naturally relatively categorical.
6 Stability Criteria and the Bad Company Problem
One of locus of activity on abstraction principles in recent years has been stability criteria
(cf. Cook [Coo12]). Some of the key stepping stones in this hierarchy are the following:
(6.1) The abstraction principle A[E] is stable if there is some cardinal λ such that, for
all κ ≥ λ, A[E] has a standard model of size κ.
(6.2) The abstraction principle A[E] is strongly stable if there is some cardinal λ such that,
for all cardinals κ, A[E] has a standard model of size κ if and only if κ ≥ λ.
As above, a structureM = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . .) is said to be standard if Sn[M ] = P (Mn)
for each n ≥ 1 (cf. § 2). Further, here one identifies the cardinality of M as |M |, i.e. the
cardinality of its first-order part. So this convention on the cardinality of the many-sorted
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structure M differs from other settings in which it would be more natural to define its
cardinality as the cardinality of the union of its various domains (cf. [Wal14b] §6.1 p. 107
equation (18), [Man96] p. 231 and [Ebb85] pp. 32, 64).
These criteria have been proposed as solutions to the so-called Bad Company Problem,
namely the problem of identifying criteria on abstraction principles which would ensure
consistency of A[E]; perhaps also joint consistency with like abstraction principles and the
ability to interpret mathematics of various sorts. Of course, the relative categoricity notions
studied here are not candidates for a solution to the Bad Company Problem since they
do not ensure consistency. However, the sufficient conditions on the equivalence relations
themselves that we have identified for relative categoricity do ensure consistency, and indeed
stability and joint consistency. In particular, we have the following results:
Proposition 6.1. Suppose that E(X, Y ) is an L0-formula and suppose that E is cardinality
coarsening on small concepts. Then for all infinite cardinals κ there is a standard model
of A[E] of cardinality κ.
Proposition 6.2. Suppose that E(X, Y ) is an L0-formula and suppose that E is bicardi-
nality coarsening. Then for all infinite cardinals κ there is a standard model of A[E] of
cardinality κ.
These two propositions imply that the equivalence relations satisfying these constraints
are stable (6.1). However, this cannot be improved to strong stability (6.2). For, consider
the following equivalence relation:
(6.3) E(X, Y ) ≡ [|V | < ω & |V | is even→ X ≈ Y ] ∧ [¬(|V | < ω & |V | is even)→ X = X]
This equivalence relation is cardinality coarsening on small concepts. In the case where
|V | < ω is even, we have that E is equinumerosity, so that |P (V )/E| ≥ |V | + 1, all concepts
are small, and thus trivially X ≈ Y implies E(X, Y ). But in the other case, E says that all
concepts are equivalent, so that again we trivially have that X ≈ Y implies E(X, Y ). So
this E is cardinality coarsening on small concepts, but A[E] is not strongly stable (6.2). For
A[E] is satisfiable on all finite odd domains but no finite even domains.
Cook [Coo12] recommends strong stability as the appropriate solution to the Bad Com-
pany Problem, and so the previous examples indicate that the solution offered by cardinality
coarsening on small concepts and bicardinality coarsening will be extensionally distinct from
Cook’s solution. However, it is worth noting that Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 imply that if
E is cardinality coarsening on small concepts (respectively, bicardinality coarsening), all
structures witnessing that E is not strongly stable will be finite.
But cardinality coarsening on small concepts and bicardinality coarsening have a more
mixed scorecard on other desiderata taken to be relevant to judging the success of proposed
solutions to the Bad Company problem. On the one hand, Proposition 6.1 and Proposi-
tion 6.2 imply that all these abstraction principles are jointly consistent since they all have
models of any infinite cardinality. But by the same token, our conditions on E restrict
the mathematics that can be recovered in the theory A[E]. Inspection of the below proof
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of these propositions show that the joint theory of all these abstraction principles will be
interpretable in second-order Peano arithmetic PA2 (cf. [Sim99] pp. 4 ff for the definition
of PA2 and cf. [Wal14b] §2 for the definition of interpretation). This is of course because a
standard model of cardinality ω is the underlying first-order domain of the standard model
of PA2, and the proofs of the propositions for the case κ = ω are formalizable in PA2. Hence,
there will be no hope of interpreting, e.g., standard ZFC-set theory by restricting attention
to such abstraction principles, because ZFC proves the consistency of PA2 and so PA2 cannot
interpret ZFC.
But it’s difficult to compare this directly to the situation of stability or strong stability.
For, suppose that Φ is a sentence of second-order logic that is true on all and only standard
models of cardinality ≥ λ. Then A[E] will be strongly stable for E(X, Y ) ≡ (X = Y ) ∨ Φ
(disjunctive abstraction principles like this are due to Heck [HJ92]). So such A[E] will be
able to encode a good deal of interpretability strength, at least when interpretability with
parameters is allowed (cf. [Wal14b] §2 for the definition of interpretations with parameters).
For instance, Φ could say that there is a model of ZFC2. It’s unknown to us whether the
interpretability strength– where the interpretation is without parameters– of the theories
associated to all stable or strongly stable abstraction principles is strictly above PA2. This
might be related to the fact that stability conditions often depend on undecidable questions
in set theory. For instance, the claim that the abstraction principle New V is strongly stable
is equivalent to the generalized continuum hypothesis (cf. [SW99] p. 315, [Coo07] p. 297).
Our conditions, by contrast, concern only what is demonstrable in a sound and complete
deductive system.
So let’s proceed to the proofs of Proposition 6.1 and Proposition 6.2. In these proofs,
we employ the notion on equivalence classes from the close of §2. We begin with a helpful
lemma:
Lemma 6.3. (Coarsening Dichotomy) Suppose that E is cardinality coarsening on small
concepts. Then for all infinite κ we have |P (κ)/E| < κ or |P (κ)/E| = |P (κ)/≈| = κ, and hence in
either case we have |P (κ)/E| ≤ κ.
Proof. So suppose that |P (κ)/E| ≥ κ. We must show that |P (κ)/E| = |P (κ)/≈| = κ. Since |P (κ)/E| ≥
κ, we of course have that X ⊆ κ implies |X| ≤ |P (κ)/E|. Then we have:
(6.4) [X, Y ⊆ κ & |Y | = |X|] =⇒ [|Y | = |X| ≤ |P (κ)/E|]
and the consequent of this conditional clearly implies E(X, Y ) since E is cardinality coars-
ening on small concepts. In terms of the equivalence classes, this says that the partition
of P (κ) by E is coarser than the partition of P (κ) by equinumerosity. Then choose rep-
resentatives X0, X1, . . . for the E-equivalence classes, so that P (κ)/E =
⊔
i∈I [Xi]E. Then
define I : P (κ)/E → P (κ)/≈ by I([Xi]E) = [Xi]≈. Then we claim that I is an injection. For,
suppose that I([Xi]E) = I([Xj]E) so that [Xi]≈ = [Xj]≈. Then |Xi| = |Xj| and so by the
previous equation we have E(Xi, Xj) and hence [Xi]E = [Xj]E and so i = j since the Xi, Xj
are representatives of the E-equivalence classes. Since I : P (κ)/E → P (κ)/≈ is indeed injec-
tive, we then have the following, where the last inequality appeals to the infinitude of κ:
|P (κ)/E| ≤ |P (κ)/≈| ≤ κ. Since we’re assuming κ ≤ |P (κ)/E|, we are done.
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So we can now prove Proposition 6.1:
Proof. Let κ be an infinite cardinal, and consider the standard structure, where < is the
natural well-ordering on the cardinal: M0 = (κ, P (κ), P (κ× κ), . . . , <). By the Coarsening
Dichotomy, we have that |P (κ)/E| ≤ κ. Choose an injection ∂̂ : P (κ)/E → κ. Then we
may define the map ∂ : P (κ) → κ by ∂(X) = ∂̂([X]E). Then by construction we have
thatM = (κ, P (κ), P (κ× κ), . . . , <, ∂) is a model of A[E] of cardinality κ.
Similarly, we can prove Proposition 6.2:
Proof. Let’s use E0 as an abbreviation for the equivalence relation of bicardinality. So since E
is bicardinality coarsening, by definition we have that E0(X, Y ) implies E(X, Y ). So as in the
proof of the Coarsening Dichotomy, this implies that |P (κ)/E| ≤ |P (κ)/E0|. Then one may argue
that |P (κ)/E| ≤ |P (κ)/E0| ≤ κ · κ ≤ κ. Since κ is infinite, the only non-trivial inequality is the
second. For this, consider the map [X]E0 7→ 〈|X| , |κ \X|〉. This is an injection because we
have by definition of E0 that E0(X, Y ) iff 〈|X| , |κ \X|〉 = 〈|Y | , |κ \ Y |〉. From |P (κ)/E| ≤ κ,
we can use the same construction as employed in the proof of the above proposition to build
models of A[E].
Since E being bicardinality coarsening is a sufficient condition for A[E] being surjectively
relatively categorical, it’s natural to ask about when there are standard models of A[E] on
which the abstraction operator is surjective.
Proposition 6.4. Suppose that E is bicardinality coarsening. Then for all infinite cardinals
κ, there is a standard model of A[E] of cardinality κ wherein the abstraction operator is
surjective if and only if |P (κ)/E| = |{λ : λ < κ}| = κ.
Proof. First suppose that there is a standard model of A[E] of cardinality κ where the
abstraction operator is surjective. Then surjectivity implies that κ = |P (κ)/E|. Then as in the
proof of the Proposition 6.1, we may argue that κ = |P (κ)/E| ≤ |P (κ)/E0| ≤ κ, so that in fact we
have an equality. Since κ is infinite, one further has that |P (κ)/E0| = |P (κ)/≈|. But trivially one
has that |P (κ)/≈| = |{λ : λ < κ}|. For the converse, suppose that |P (κ)/E| = |{λ : λ < κ}| = κ,
so that trivially |P (κ)/E| = κ. Then the model construction from the previous proposition
yields a model of A[E] in which the abstraction operator is surjective.
7 Antonelli and Fine on Logicality and Invariance
The famous Tarski-Sher thesis on logicality ([Tar86], [She91]) suggests that logical notions
are those that are invariant under all permutations of the domain. This can be made precise
as follows. If pi : M → M is a permutation, then pi induces permutations pi : Mn → Mn
and pi : P (M)→ P (M). By iterating, a permutation pi : M → M induces a permutation of
any sort of ω-th order higher-order structure with first-order domain M . Then one says:
(7.1) A subset X of any sort of this structure is permutation-invariant if pi(X) = X holds
for all permutations pi : M →M .
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So part of what we want to do in this section is to carefully distinguish this notion coming
from Tarski-Sher from our notion of permutation invariance for abstraction principles (1.5).
To illustrate the Tarski-Sher notion, consider X = {(A,B,C) ∈ (P (M))3 : A ∩ B = C}.
Then for any permutation pi : M →M , we have
(7.2) A ∩B = C ⇐⇒ pi(A ∩B) = pi(C)⇐⇒ pi(A) ∩ pi(B) = pi(C)
So intersection comes out logical in this sense, and similarly for all the other boolean oper-
ations.
Antonelli ([Ant10b]) distinguishes several ways that abstraction principles and their
associated equivalence relations can be invariant. One way is in terms of the abstraction
operator itself. Since the abstraction operator is a function from concepts to objects, its graph
is a certain collection of ordered pairs of concepts and objects. Hence an abstraction principle
will be logical in the sense of Tarski-Sher just if this collection of ordered pairs is closed
under the taking of permutations. This of course happens if and only if ∂(X) = a implies
∂(pi(X)) = pi(a) and vice-versa for all permutations pi : V → V . And this is equivalent
to the requirement that ∂(pi(X)) = pi(∂(X)) for all permutations pi : V → V . Antonelli
calls abstraction principles which satisfy this condition objectually invariant ([Ant10b] p.
286). However, objectually invariant abstraction operators are rare. For instance, Hume’s
Principle is not objectually invariant, nor is the Bicardinality Principle. Hence, if one insisted
upon the logicality of abstraction operators in the sense of Tarski-Sher, then as Antonelli
notes this would rule out most interesting examples (cf. [Ant10b] p. 286).
The notion which we are calling permutation invariance (1.5) is called simple invariance
by Antonelli ([Ant10b] p. 286). This notion was studied earlier in Burgess’ discussion
of Fine’s work on abstraction principles ([Bur05] p. 171). However, the notion which Fine
himself was primarily interested in was the permutation invariance of the equivalence relation
itself (cf. [Fin02] p. 111):
(7.3) ∀ bijection pi : V→V (E(X, Y )→ E(pi(X), pi(Y ))
This of course is just the logicality of the equivalence relation E in the sense of Tarski-
Sher. However, Fine rather motivates this constraint on equivalence relations by reference
to Frege’s ideas about the generality of logic ([Fin02] p. 109, cf. [Mac02] p. 34), and does
not at all invoke the Tarski-Sher thesis. But whatever its motivation, all the equivalence
relations E studied here will satisfy this constraint since they are assumed to be formulas
in the background signature L0 (cf. Definition 2.1), and so will all be invariant under
permutations in the sense of (7.3).
Antonelli’s work on abstraction principles and notions of permutation invariance ([Ant10b])
complements his work on abstraction principles and generalized quantifiers ([Ant10a, Ant10c]).
In this work, the idea was to think about the equivalence relations featuring in abstraction
principles as examples of generalized quantifiers. For instance, the truth-condition of the
sentence “Just as many students [A] as teachers [B] are hockey fans [C],” is given by the gen-
eralized quantifier Q(A,B,C) ≡ |A ∩ C| = |B ∩ C|. So one could then view Hume’s Prin-
ciple as yielding a way to provide generalized quantifiers with first-order truth-conditions.
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The connection to permutation invariance in the sense of (7.1) and (7.3) is that this is one
condition among many that have been developed for assaying which generalized quantifiers
actually occur in natural language (cf. [PW08] pp. 157, 330, [KM85] p. 77).
However, neither Antonelli nor Burgess is committed to there being any positive reason
for insisting on the constraint of permutation invariance in the sense of (1.5). It clearly does
not follow from the Tarski-Sher logicality constraint on the abstraction operator or on the
underlying equivalence relation. Further, it’s not obviously required by the generality of logic
since there are many equivalence relations which are expressible purely in the language L0 of
our background second-order logic which are not permutation invariant in the sense of (1.5).
However, our Theorem 1.2 suggests an instrumental reason to be interested in equivalence
relations which are permutation invariant in the sense of (1.5). For, it indicates that its a
necessary and sufficient condition for a type of relative categoricity. So if one was interested
in determinacy of truth-value in the sense of natural relative categoricity, this result would
give one a reason to be interested in permutation invariance in the sense of (1.5).
Fine was himself interested in determinacy and established several categoricity results.
His first result concerns what we called cardinality coarsening (4.15), a notion which Fine
calls numericality ([Fin02] p. 126). This first categoricity theorem of Fine’s can be stated
in our terminology as follows:
Theorem 7.1. ([Fin02] p. 126) Suppose that M is a model of A2[E] as in equation (3.2)
where E is cardinality coarsening, and suppose thatMmodels |M \ rng(∂1)| = |M \ rng(∂2)|.
For each i ∈ {1, 2}, consider the following induced models
(7.4) Ni = (M,S1[M ], S2[M ], . . . , ∂i)
Then N1 is isomorphic to N2.
This theorem of Fine’s occurs far within his book [Fin02] which treats a great variety of
topics and issues. In our view, this result deserves to be better known– for instance, it is
not discussed in the Philosophical Studies book symposium on Fine’s book (cf. [Fin05]), nor
is it treated in Burgess’ discussion of Fine ([Bur05] Chapter 3). For this reason and for the
sake of completeness, let us record its proof:
Proof. By the hypothesis, there is a bijection from M \ rng(∂1) to M \ rng(∂2). But the
natural bijection Γ is a bijection from rng(∂1) to rng(∂2). By joining these two bijec-
tions, we may obtain a bijection ∆ : M → M such that ∆  rng(∂1) is the natural bi-
jection Γ : rng(∂1)→ rng(∂2). Extend to ∆ : N1 → N2 by setting ∆(X) = {∆(x) : x ∈ X}.
Then we claim that ∆ : N1 → N2 is an isomorphism. Let X ∈ S1[M ]. We must show
that ∆(∂1(X)) = ∂2(∆(X)). Since ∆ extends the natural bijection, this is equivalent to
∂2(X) = ∂2(∆(X)). And sinceM |= A2[E], this is equivalent to E(X,∆(X)). But since E
is cardinality coarsening, of course E(X,∆(X)) follows from ∆(X) ≈ X.
Some special cases of Fine’s Theorem can be viewed as a combination of certain parts of
our results. For instance, if E is cardinality coarsening, then E is bicardinality coarsening (cf.
Figure 1) and hence A[E] is surjectively relatively categorical by one direction of Theorem 1.2.
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This same result follows from the special case of Fine’s theorem wherein one assumes that
M \ rng(∂1) and M \ rng(∂2) are both empty. However, nothing in Fine’s Theorem concerns
the other direction of our results, namely that certain conditions like cardinality coarsening
on small concepts and bicardinality coarsening are necessary for various forms of relative
categoricity. Another difference between our work and Fine’s work is with the precise induced
models which figure in the statement of the results. In particular, the induced structures Ni
in (7.4) are different from the induced structures Mi from (3.3) with which we have been
working in that the structuresMi restrict their first-order domain down to the range of the
abstraction operator ∂i. Of course, these two types of induced models will align in the case
where the abstraction operators are surjective. So while Fine’s theorem predicts that Hume’s
Principle is, in our terminology, surjectively relatively categorical, it does not obviously have
any implications for the natural relative categoricity of Hume’s Principle.
Fine’s second categoricity theorem concerns a general theory of abstraction which he
terms GA+. Roughly, this theory is the amalgamation of abstraction principles A[E] which
satisfy a combination of Tarski-Sher permutation invariance conditions (7.1) and varieties
of stability-like conditions as discussed in §6. For the sake of simplicity, let’s consider the
case of a single such abstraction principle A[E]. Fine’s second theorem then indicates that
any modelM of A2[E] which satisfies the constraint that M \ rng(∂1) and M \ rng(∂2) have
the same cardinality will be such that the induced structures Ni in (7.4) are isomorphic.
The official statement of Fine’s second theorem is more complicated since one must precisely
define the analogue A2[E1, E2, . . .] of A2[E] in the case where abstraction principles associated
to E1, E2, . . . are present. See Fine [Fin02] p. 189 for the precise statement of this result,
and see Fine [Fin02] p. 170 for the precise statement of the theory GA+.
In the subsequent section of his book ([Fin02] pp. 189 ff), Fine proceeds to examine the
interpretability strength of GA+ and related theories. It is in the context of surveying these
results (cf. [Bur05] p. 171) that Burgess introduces the notion what we have called per-
mutation invariance (1.5), which does not occur in Fine’s own work. In particular, Burgess
introduces a theory (cf. [Bur05] p. 173) in which one assumes that the equivalence rela-
tions E are permutation invariant in our sense (1.5) and further that there are at most two
equivalence classes:
(7.5) ∃ X, Y ∀ Z (E(Z,X) ∨ E(Z, Y ))
This last condition is less restrictive than one might initially expect, since Burgess is working
in a setting where one can consider equivalence relations not only on second-order objects, but
on third order-objects, fourth-order objects, etc. However, Burgess uses this theory merely
to motivate elements of Fine’s theory, so that neither Fine nor Burgess suggest restricting
attention to theories which satisfy these specific conditions.
As to its broader philosophical significance, Fine notes that one path to determinacy
of truth-value would proceed through categoricity results like Theorem 7.1. For instance,
discussing the specialization of this result to the “number of” abstraction operator, Fine
writes: “Thus once we know the cardinality of the non-numbers, we are in a position to
specify the truth of every arithmetical statement in purely logical terms” ([Fin02] p. 86, cf.
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p. 93). But ultimately Fine rejected this path to determinacy of truth-value, due to concerns
about one’s access to claims about the cardinality of parts of the domain. He writes: “The
difficulty with this approach is to see how someone could grasp what these truth-conditions
are without already having access to an infinite domain of abstract objects” ([Fin02] p.
94). This was one reason among many that led Fine to develop an alternative approach on
which one postulates “a procedure for the construction of the domain” ([Fin06] p. 90). This
“procedural postulationism” is designed to secure not only determinacy of truth-value but
also determinacy of reference ([Fin06] p. 89, [Fin02] p. 100). While this is no place to discuss
Fine’s later procedural postulationism, it’s worth underscoring that the specific worry which
Fine cites with respect to categoricity results does not seem so damaging to one who would
insist on the requirement of natural relative categoricity. For, unlike the hypotheses of Fine’s
Theorem (Theorem 7.1), there are no assumptions in natural relative categoricity about the
cardinality of the non-abstracts. However, Fine’s concern might worry someone who insisted
on the requirement of surjective relative categoricity as it is unclear how someone could have
advance assurance that every object is an abstract.
8 Hodes and Supervaluationism
The work of Hodes ([Hod84], [Hod90], [Hod91]) constitutes a sustained attempt to forge
techniques and ideas from Frege’s Grundlagen into a viable version of fictionalism. Hodes
writes: “[. . . ] mathematical discourse, when carried on within the mathematical object-
picture, [is] a special sort of fictional discourse: numbers are fictions ‘created’ with a special
purpose, to encode numerical object-quantifiers and thereby enable us to ‘pull down’ a frag-
ment of third-order logic, dressing it in first-order clothing” ( [Hod84] p. 144). Hodes differs
from other fictionalists in his invocation of supervaluationist semantics, by which Hodes can
say with fictionalists that mathematical language doesn’t refer, but also affirm that certain
sentences containing mathematical vocabulary are true in a very demanding sense.
One can implement Hodes-style supervaluationism with respect to an arbitrary equiv-
alence relation. Hodes does this only with respect to equivalence relations associated to
cardinality and sets, in [Hod90] and [Hod91] respectively. But it seems to us that the defi-
nitions offered in [Hod90] pp. 364-365, [Hod91] p. 158 naturally generalize as follows:
Definition 8.1. Suppose that E(X, Y ) is an L0-formula and κ is a cardinal, and suppose
further that ϕ is an L0[∂]-sentence. Then ϕ is said to be κ-supertrue relative to A[E] (resp.
κ-superfalse relative to A[E]) if for all standard modelsM of A[E] of cardinality κ, it is also
the case thatM |= ϕ (resp. M |= ¬ϕ). Further, ϕ is said to be κ-bivalent relative to A[E]
if ϕ is κ-supertrue or κ-superfalse.
In this definition, we are, as in the previous sections, identifying the cardinality of the model
M of A[E] with the cardinality of its first-order part.
As this definition makes clear, Hodes’ approach was focused on the standard seman-
tics for second-order logic. Moreover, there’s a reason for this: if one instead used the
Henkin semantics, then the analogue of supertruth would reduce to provability, at least in
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the case where A[E] has only infinite models. This is the content of the following elementary
proposition, whose proof we omit since it is a simple application of the Löwenheim-Skolem
theorems.
Proposition 8.2. Suppose that E(X, Y ) is an L0-formula and A[E] is consistent but has
only infinite models. Suppose further that ϕ is an L0[∂]-sentence and κ is an infinite cardinal.
If all modelsM of A[E] of cardinality κ satisfy ϕ, then A[E] proves ϕ.
So this proposition indicates that something is gained by Hodes’ invocation of standard
models, namely, the idea of supertruth does not reduce to that of deduction.
Hodes’ fictionalism suggests the idea of maximizing bivalence, and so Hodes himself
established various results indicating that “[. . . ] our actual mathematical reasoning makes
no use of sentences parsed by non-bivalent sentences [. . . ]” ([Hod90] p. 370, cf. Observations
4-5 pp. 367-368). With an eye towards maximizing bivalence, we introduce the following
definition of bivalence-compatibility:
Definition 8.3. The abstraction principle A[E] is bivalence-compatible if there is an infinite
cardinal κ such that ϕ is κ-bivalent relative to A[E] for each L0[∂]-sentence ϕ.
There might be other ways of maximizing bivalence, but this at least seems like a natural
enough route: the idea is that there’s some size such that all standard models of that size
must agree on the truth-value of sentences expressible using the abstraction operator.
It’s then natural to ask which abstraction principles are bivalence compatible. By using
Fine’s Theorem 7.1 and the Coarsening Dichotomy (Lemma 6.3), one can easily show:
Proposition 8.4. If E is cardinality coarsening then A[E] is bivalence compatible, and
indeed A[E] is ω1-bivalent.
Proof. Letting κ = ω1, let’s note that the Coarsening Dichotomy Lemma implies that
|P (κ)/E| < κ. Since |P (κ)/E| < κ, it follows that for any model M of A2[E] (1.2) with
cardinality κ, we have that |rng(∂i)| < κ. By Infinite Sums are Maxs (2.11), we have that
|M \ rng(∂1)| = κ = |M \ rng(∂2)|. Then by Fine’s Theorem 7.1, we have N1 and N2 as de-
fined in equation (7.4) are isomorphic. So for any sentence ϕ of L0[∂], we have that N1 |= ϕ
iff N2 |= ϕ.
The situation with respect to bicardinality coarsening and cardinality coarsening on
small concepts is slightly more subtle. As for bicardinality coarsening, since it was introduced
in connection with surjective relative categoricity, it’s natural to modify the definition of
κ-bivalence (Definition 8.1) so that attention is restricted to models of A[E] where the
abstraction operator is surjective. Now it’s not necessarily the case that every bicardinality
coarsening equivalence relation will have such a model for a given κ. For instance, the
Bicardinality Principle from §5 won’t have such a model for κ = ω1, as one can easily check
by reference to Proposition 6.4. However, for those cardinals κ for which there are such
models, Theorem 1.2 trivially implies that bicardinality coarsening suffices for κ-bivalence
in the modified sense, since again isomorphism suffices for elementary equivalence.
As for cardinality coarsening on small concepts, it is simply unknown to us whether this
implies bivalence compatibility. So we record the following question:
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Question 8.5. Suppose that E(X, Y ) is an L0-formula which is provably an equivalence
relation in our background second-order logic and which is cardinality coarsening on small
concepts. Is it necessarily the case that A[E] is bivalence compatible?
If this question is answered in the negative, then it would indicate that the way in which
natural relative categoricity captures the idea of determinacy of truth-value is distinct from
the way in which Hodes’ supervaluationism captures this idea. Of course, these two notions
are extensionally distinct since an equivalence relation can be bivalence compatible simply by
mimicking Hume’s Principle on domains of cardinality ω1 and appealing to Proposition 8.4,
while violating cardinality coarsening on small concepts on domains of other sizes. So the
interesting direction is that which is at issue in the above question, since a negative answer
would indicate that these two determinacy of truth-value ideas studied in our work and
Hodes work are orthogonal to one another.
9 Conclusions
Our goal has been to articulate various notions of relative categoricity for abstraction prin-
ciples and to study which abstraction principles are accordingly relative categorical. The
import of our Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 is that such relatively categorical abstraction
principles qualitatively look like Hume’s Principle. Our results contravene the general expe-
rience we have with relative categoricity. For, this notion is highly non-domain-specific in
that one has relatively categorical axiomatizations of number, set, the reals, etc. But when
we restrict attention down to abstraction principles, our Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 show
that relative categoricity is tied to cardinality coarsening notions.
Finally, it’s worth emphasizing the limited scope of our study. First, we have focused
exclusively on abstraction principles formed from equivalence relations on unary concepts,
and many natural abstraction principles like that associated to the Burali-Forti paradox
concern abstraction principles on binary concepts. Antonelli ([Ant10a] pp. 10-11) notes that
the equivalence relation associated to the Burali-Forti paradox is permutation invariant in
the sense of (1.5) once one extends this notion naturally from equivalence relations on unary
concepts to binary concepts, and similarly it will be injection invariant. So this indicates
that the study of relative categoricity concepts will be quite different when one goes from
equivalence relations on unary concepts to those on binary concepts. For instance, this
example indicates that in this more general setting we can’t have that injection invariance
suffices for having standard models of infinite cardinality (cf. Proposition 6.1). So it’s hard
to predict apriori how much of the present study holds when we pass from equivalence
relations on unary concepts to those on binary concepts or n-ary concepts.
A similar limitation that should be emphasized is that we have focused on some specific
notions of relative categoricity, namely natural relative categoricity and surjective relative
categoricity. It would of course be ideal to have analogues of Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2
for the notion of relative elementary equivalence and bivalence compatibility (Definition 5.1
and Definition 8.3), but we have been unable to obtain any such characterizations. Further,
as indicated in Question 5.2 and Question 8.5, even the relationships between these notions
38
and our notions is not yet resolved. As a final note, it should be underscored that natural
relative categoricity concerns a specific bijection (namely, the natural bijection) being an
isomorphism. In Corollary 4.1, we noted that this is the only isomorphism when natural
relative categoricity does obtain. But it would be important to study the more general
notion of relative categoricity which did not restrict attention to the natural bijection. We
have been unable to establish analogues of Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 for this more
general notion. Our motivation for considering the natural bijection Γ(∂1(X)) = ∂2(X)
is that this seemed like a natural enough way for agents to exchange information about
their abstraction operators, broadly similar in character to Parsons’ agents translating their
interlocutor’s arithmetical vocabulary by their own arithmetical vocabulary.
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